A bazaar of Russian military hardware accompanied thousands of Haftar’s troops as they marched in formation at a new military complex southwest of Benghazi. On show were Pantsir-S1E air defence systems, Tor-M1/M2 short-range surface-to-air missiles, Mi-26 transport helicopters, caged T-72 and T-62 tanks, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launch systems – the full alpha-numeric arsenal.
“These arms are a significant upgrade to Haftar’s capabilities,” a former Western security official told Field. “Also, they reflect the strength of the Russian military-industrial complex that they can afford to give away, or sell, this quantity of kit at this time.”
“The Russian military-patriotic blogosphere isn’t happy at the extent of the support to Haftar while Russia’s troops are having to make do with subpar kit in Ukraine”, said a Russian defence analyst.
“Regime change in Syria explains the timing of Haftar’s sudden upgrade within Moscow’s ecosystem of surrogates,” a Libya watcher from the region told Field. “That, and Libya’s irresistible position on the doorstep of southern Europe as the war in Ukraine thunders on.” A European Libya analyst agreed, telling us that “after Syria, Russia needed a new home for its influence operations in the Mediterranean and also for the broader African continent”.
What’s more, there has been a corresponding transformation in the nature of the relationship. “Russia drawing closer to Haftar is fundamentally different now than their previous work together during the 2019-2020 Libyan civil war. It’s no longer about proxy support: we can start speaking of an overt military alliance in which favours will be traded,” the Libya watcher added.
This sea-change in Haftar’s cooperation with Moscow coincides with disunity and violent realignment amongst Haftar’s opponents in western Libya. Fierce fighting erupted in the capital in mid-May when Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh tried to disband some of the Tripolitan militias which work as independent power breakers loosely under his rule. “Calm has since been restored but many armed groups are still bristling and demonstrations by the public have called for an end to Dbeibeh’s time in power and to his family’s grip on state institutions and the economy”, said the regional Libya watcher.
At the televised Benghazi parade Haftar announced that his forces would have “the final word at the critical moment.” Many interpreted this statement as a threat to launch a renewed offensive against Tripoli, capitalising on both the disarray and the new military edge of his forces. However, one former senior Libyan official told Field that “Libyans know the truth about Haftar and Dbeibeh, that they are close allies who share power and cooperate on a daily basis in stealing our national wealth.” He added, “most Libyans also understand that the decision to go to war is not in Haftar’s hands any more than it is in Dbeibeh’s. It’s foreign powers that take those types of decisions now in Libya – like Türkiye, but especially Russia. And it serves Russia’s interests to keep Libya divided and weak.”
More than two thousand Russian military personnel and Wagner mercenaries are stationed across Libya, at air bases such as Brak Al-Shati in the southwest, Jufra in the centre and Maaten Al Sarra deep into the Sahel. Security sources tell Field that these facilities are being upgraded daily and preparations are underway for a naval base on the Mediterranean coast.
“Our military facilities are no longer Libyan, they are Russian”, said the Libyan intelligence official. “No Libyan citizen, not even the corrupt leaders and warlords, wants to be stationing missiles with a range of 1000km at Tamanhint air base so that they could potentially be launched towards Italy. But that’s exactly what the Russians are doing now, and it’s all about their own strategic ends and their conflict with Europe.”