“The Israeli attack on Syrian forces heading to Suweida is inexplicable,” a Middle Eastern security analyst told Field.
“The Syrian government forces were pretty much doing their job, going to stop clashes between armed fighters from two different constituencies. The national security forces had informed the Israelis through the right channels that they were moving tanks to Suweida and the Israelis bombed them. And then the Israelis bombed their military command building in Damascus.”
“The Israeli intervention makes perfect sense,” a Western diplomat based in the region told us. “But this is not about the Druze, let’s clear that up. This is about Israel and this – far-right – government’s strategic vision, today.”
“The Israelis are rightly concerned about the Islamist roots of the new regime in Syria,” a Middle East watcher told Field. “Sharaa and his guys may be pragmatists today but they were Al-Qaeda the day before yesterday. So Israel does not want to see this new government succeed. Keeping Syria divided keeps it weak, or weaker I should say. The country is already on its knees but preventing the centralisation of power achieves Israel’s goal of not allowing Syria to be used as a staging post for Iran again. The other way to do that would be a peace treaty, but that isn’t going to happen!”
Most of our contacts do not feel that the intervention is because of the Druze themselves. “The Druze are not one group,” a Syrian Druze from the occupied Golan Heights told us. “We burnt Israeli ID cards when they tried to issue them to us in the 80’s [1982], we are Syrian and most people were pretty loyal to the Assad regime until the revolution. In Lebanon, under Walid Jumblatt the Druze supported the revolutionaries and Free Syrian Army against the regime. The Palestinian Druze, or Israeli Druze are loyal to Israel, that’s the way it works. That’s how we survive by being a minority, by being loyal to the state we are in.”
In Israel, the Druze are 1.6% of the population and although Netanyahu faces an election by October 2026, this group are far from homogenous in how they vote and unlikely to vote on the single issue of Israeli intervention purportedly on behalf of the Druze in Suweida, we are told.
The Druze – Bedouin clashes themselves are not surprising. Small and medium calibre arms are widespread across Syria and it will probably take a decade for the state to regain the monopoly over the use of force. “Some officials close to the President are really annoyed,” a former State Department official told us. “Trump actually really likes Sharaa, thought he was a straightforward guy he could do business with. We [the US] would like Syria in the Abraham Accords, that would be a massive win for the President and good for Israel and bad for Iran. Israel bombing the [Syrian government forces] tanks was really unhelpful, going in the wrong direction for where we want to be.”
A Syrian journalist was more sanguine. “Syria can’t make peace with Israel now. For the Syrians, we have to get back the Golan Heights from Israel. That’s our only condition, it’s our land and we want it back. The Israelis extending their military control into more Syrian territory is exactly the opposite of that. And for Sharaa it would be suicide. The hardcore [Islamists] of his alliance will absolutely go against him – along with everyone else, including the Suweida Druze, they didn’t ask for this Israeli intervention, they are Druze and they are Syrian.”
In the northeast of Syria, the Kurds are watching closely. In Iraq, Israel has courted the ethnic group “as part of the ethnification of the region, if that’s a word” said the Middle East watcher. “This Israeli government is all about a Jewish state, so extreme right wing Israelis want other ethno-states to help justify their own aspirations. The Kurds are not convinced that Israel has staying power as an ally. They think that Israel will drop the Suweida Druze if they don’t need them as an issue any longer.”
The Western diplomat referenced the regional dimension. “Israel’s bigger problem probably lies in Turkey and Saudi Arabia which both want to see stability in Syria now. Turkey is obviously a major supporter of the new Syrian government. Saudi Arabia does not want to see a weak Syria which could reopen the door to Iranian influence and will certainly not normalise with Israel while it is bombing its Arab neighbours.”
The security advisor concluded “The Syrians can’t respond, literally. The Israelis would be taking a big risk on another new extended military project – people are already forgetting that they just had a mini-war with Iran. Not because anyone can stop them militarily, but because behind closed doors even their friends and allies are telling them ‘enough, no more now’ ”.
Druze Groups and Leaders
Main armed groups
Rijal al-Karama movement: founded in 2013 to prevent attempts by the Assad regime to recruit young Druze men to auxiliary/mercenary groups separate from the Syrian army. The movement gained traction in Suweida and was perceived as a threat to the Assad regime. Its founder, Sheikh Wahid Balous, was assassinated in a car bombing in 2015. Leadership of the movement changed in 2017. Estimated to number around 800 fighters. The movement refuses to hand in their weapons to the government and ought against government forces in recent clashes.
Sheikh al-Karama movement: founded in 2018 by the sons of the founder of Rijal al-Karama who defected from the original movement following changes of leadership and direction. Opposed recruitment of young men to militias supported by Assad/Russia/Iran, and to the Assad regime’s army and organised protests against the Assad regime. Following Assad’s fall, the movement supported the idea of unifying forces and merging with the new Syrian Ministry of Defence. Participated in the operations that led to the fall of the regime and secured many weapons from military units and handed them over to the new Syrian state. It also played a major role in conflict resolution and has been attacked for siding with al-Sharaa in the recent clashes.
Ahrar Jabal al-Arab: founded in 2022, rejects calls for international protection for the Druze, insist that Suweida is an integral part of Syria. In favour of a united Syrian national army. Mediated calm during the clashes.
Military Council: established in February 2025, gathers pro-Assad factions and includes former regime officers. Accused of being one of the main instigators of the clashes against the Bedouins. Supports demands for international protection of the Druze. Reportedly works in coordination with the Syrian Democratic Forces [the Kurdish group].
“Quwat Mukafahat al-Irhab” [Anti-Terrorism Force]: 700 fighters, military wing of the Syrian ‘Liwa’ political party. Works closely with the Military Council, close to SDF, and supports separation.
Other small armed factions and armed families: some coordinates with the military council. Some to protect their drug and arms trafficking trade.
Religious Leaders
Religious figures naturally also play a role in shaping the attitudes of local residents and civilians in Sweida. Among the historical leaders in Sweida are the Jarbou’, Hinnawi, and Hijri families, whose influence has recently become acutely important.
Jarbou’ is moderate, solution oriented, had a key role in mediating the truce of 16 July. Hinnawi is neutral, supports national dialogue. Hikmat al-Hijri is a controversial religious figure who rejects negotiations with the Syrian government.