It is public that commentators from Israeli Channel 14 have aggressively attacked the MoU. Channel 14 pundits have been very pro-Trump and supportive of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public positions, often expressing views that Netanyahu cannot express given his febrile relationship with the US President. An Israeli analyst told Field, “JD Vance seems to be saving the diplomacy for Iran. He all but threatened the Israeli parliament not to criticise the deal, not-so-subtly reminding them that America was their only friend left. Some friend it is who sells out your security to try and save the midterms.”
“We [Israel] can undermine this deal at any second,” an Israeli pundit told Field. “Hizbullah is Bibi’s [Netanyahu] get out of the deal card. The IDF destroys some homes, Hizbullah shoots at us, we bomb dozens of targets and it’s over. Look at what just happened [four Israeli soldiers were killed and Israel responded with 80 airstrikes]. This is going to be a battle of wills between Trump and Bibi.”
A former UK Iran desk officer offered a more positive view, “The MoU differs from 2015’s JCPOA in that it is broader in scope, as it’s trying to address the Iranian nuclear issue through a regional prism, not as a narrow enrichment issue. The rather generous $300 billion earmarked for Iran’s reconstruction should be seen as an attempt to anchor a peace deal in a regional framework in which regional powers are incentivised to make it work and shepherd its progress over the line. Clearly a win for Iran, but also an attempt at fostering regional buy in, an aspect that JCPOA fatally ignored. This is new and it’s genuinely positive.”
The framework is therefore different and so are the incentives. The desk officer told us, “The MoU lifts sanctions on Iran. This is massive. And it looks like a huge American concession to the Iranians to get them to lift the blockade [of the Strait of Hormuz] and get the global economy back to where it was before this all started.”
This conflict was partially justified on the necessity of ending Iranian nuclear enrichment. It appears that the best outcome will be that the deal on uranium enrichment will simply mirror the exact terms of the JCPOA. This is likely to be true for the Additional Protocol that restrains Iran from weaponisation related research and development – a provision previously exploited by Iran. “Trump’s calls for zero enrichment will start to look like ancient history when the talks get going,” said one Iran watcher.
“The JCPOA felt flimsy from the start because there was no actual implementation mechanism. The MoU provides for a mechanism and this is a win for Trump,” the Iran watcher acknowledged.
A former State department official who worked on Iran sanctions said to Field, “Let’s be real, if this turns into a real deal – and that’s the $300 billion if – there are miles to go before this comes close to the comprehensiveness and technicality of the JCPOA. That was an agreement. This is essentially a back of the napkin scribble. They’ve kicked the can down the road on all the hard issues. They’re hoping we all forget the original objectives of the war and settle for an IOU for – at best – a return to the status quo before Trump ripped up the first deal.”
The Western diplomat in the region also noted the limitations of the deal. “The IRGC is here to stay, with a new [Supreme Leader] Khamanei at the helm who may be worse than his father. All that talk of the Iranian people rising up and toppling the regime was always a fantasy given how many times they have tried and failed. So, in Iran there are hardliners making noise that they hate this deal, just as there are in Israel, but that provides cover to the leadership so they can present themselves as pragmatic to the West.”
“The IRGC will be almost impossible to get out from power now,” an Iranian dissident said to Field. “No doubt, IRGC is the winner. They survived and still have missiles. This deal is very bad for the Iranian people.”
“Trump had to end it,” the European diplomat told Field. “The US failed to prepare for this war, it’s still a question as to how exactly the talks, which were actually moving forward in February, suddenly collapsed into conflict. Trump is under real pressure at home and from within his own party ahead of the mid-terms. Netanyahu’s popularity dipped when people started to see exactly what the IDF did in Gaza and the global reaction but Iran took him right back up domestically at least. Trump feels duped.” Angry exchanges between Trump and Netanyahu have been publicly reported.
One comparison doing the rounds in the immediate aftermath of the MoU is to Syria where President Ahmed Shara leads a government that has successfully rehabilitated itself in the eyes of the world and with the personal endorsement of President Trump. “Trump can do business with Shara. Can Trump do business with anyone in Tehran?” the Iran watcher reflected. “The one to watch is Iran’s lead negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who JD Vance has formed a cordial working relationship with.”
The Iran watcher told us that, “Ghalibaf, however powerful he is now, is not historically on good terms with his more hardline IRGC compatriots who may want to rein him in once a deal has been signed. Ghalibaf has always had ambitions for high office and extreme wealth so he could potentially do business with the US, but he’s going to have to be careful that he doesn’t cross the hardliners. He won’t win.”
The MoU is an attempt to manage “fiendishly complex issues with vast regional ramifications,” in the words of a former diplomat with a front row seat at previous negotiations. Over the next 60 days there are endless ways it could go wrong.
“There are three parties here and they could all sabotage the deal. Iran is probably in the strongest position, but they could still overplay their hand,” the former diplomat noted. “Trump could walk away, if say the US wins the World Cup [said sarcastically] or for whatever other reason. Israel could engage in Lebanon, triggering an Iranian reaction, or could attack Iran unilaterally, as they did recently [on 7-8 June]. Iran closes the Strait again and then what happens? Oil prices go back up, global economy slows down, and Trump has to take on Netanyahu. I wouldn’t like to pick a winner on that one.”
Two quick broader observations were made by a number of contacts regarding the elections in Israel and the US taking place later in the year. In those contexts, the Western diplomat noted that “Gaza and the West Bank have dropped completely off the political table, the extreme right in Israel are moving with absolute freedom doing whatever they like.”
“If there was any serious thought about taking on Cuba next that’s not going to happen,” a US defence source commented to Field. “You saw the stuff in the media, the soft campaign to create a public agenda for action. Iran’s been a disaster. Trump knows he can’t afford to take another misstep into the darkness.”